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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELIZABETH JO·NES 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
HORMAN'S INC., a Utah corpora-
tion, ALLEN STEEL COMPANY 
J Utah corporation, JO·HN DOE 
and RICHARD RO£, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
9956 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
HORMAN'S INC. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant Horman's Inc. generally agrees with the 
statement of facts set forth in plaintiff's brief. May we, 
however, state certain procedural matters to afford a 
clear understanding of the holding of the trial court. 
Defendants Horman's Inc. and Allen Steel Company 
each filed motions for summary judgment noticed for 
hearing at the pretrial of this action. (R 29, 3 0, 31) 
Counsel for defendants argued their respective motions 
for summary judgment at the pretrial held on May 8, 
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1963. Portions of the depositions of the plaintiff and her 
husband Julius Jones were read to the pretrial judge. The 
judge requested that counsel file memorandums setting 
forth the facts and the law so he would be fully advised on 
the matter. The court also granted plaintiff's motion to 
amend her complaint. 
D.efendant Allen Steel Company filed its memoran-
dum of authorities on May 10, 1963 (R 57 to 62) The 
memorandum contained a ((statement of facts" and an 
argument on the law. Defendant Horman's, Inc. filed its 
memorandum on May 13, 1963. (R 52 to 56) This mem-
orandum also contained a complete statement of facts 
and the applicable law. 
On May 20, 1963, plaintiff's attorney filed a reply 
to the memorandums of Horman's· Inc. and Allen Steel 
Company. (R 64 to 67) In the memorandum plaintiff's 
attorney made the following statement: 
FACTS 
nFor the purpose of argument in connection 
with the motions for summary judgment made by 
said defendants herein, plaintiff accepts as sub-
stantially correct the statement of facts set forth 
in each said memorandum." (Italics ours) 
Plaintiff filed her amended complaint on May 20, 
1963. (R 36-37) Defendant Horman's Inc. filed a supple-
mental memorandum on May 22, 1963. (R 38 to 40) 
Subsequently, on June 3, 1963, an order was entered 
granting the motions for summary judgment in favor of 
the defendants. (R 43) 
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Plaintiff has adopted as her statement of facts on 
this appeal the statement of facts contained in the de-
fendant's memorandums. (Appellant's Brief Page 3). 
ARGUMENT 
THE RECORD CO~NTAINS A STATEMENT Of 
FACTS ACCEPTED BY ALL PARTIES WHICH EN-
ABLES THE COURT TO DETERMINE THE ISSUES 
PRESENTED. 
In Thompson v. Ford Motor Company, 384 P. 2d 
109, (Utah 1963) and Schubach v. Wagner, 3 84 P. 2d 
110, (Utah 1963) the Supreme Court reversed summary 
judgments because there was nothing in the record which 
enabled the court to determine the issues presented. 
In the instant case both defendants submitted state-
ments of fact in their memorandums. The plaintiff's 
attorney accepted this statement of facts as substantially 
correct. Plaintiff's statement of facts in its brief is ap-
parently taken from the statement of facts in the mem-
orandum filed by defendant Horman's Inc. There is no 
dispute as to the facts in this case. The trial court had 
before it an agreed statement of the facts, at the time· it 
ruled on the motions for summary judgment. This court 
has the facts before it as contained in the memorandums. 
Plaintiff cannot complain that the depositions of the 
plaintiff and her husband were not published or intro-
duced in evidence. The only purpose this could serve 
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would be to get the facts into the record. Inasmuch as the 
appellant agreed to defendants' statement of the facts in 
the memorandums, the facts are P'art of the record in the 
case by stipulation. . 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides: 
· (( (c) :~o * * The judgment sought shall be ren-
dered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving. party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law."' * * :~o (Italics ours) 
In the instant case there was no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and the trial court held the defendants 
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
It would appear to be a useless act to require the 
parties to publish the depositions and the court to read 
the depositions when the P'arties agreed to the facts. It 
is the statement of facts accepted by all parties which 
forms the basis for the summary judgment. 
In Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity and Guaranty 
Insurance Underwriters Inc. 14 Utah 2d 169, 380 P. Zd 
135 (Utah 1963) this court affirmed a summary judg-
ment when the depositions had not been published or 
presented to the trial court. Here the plaintiff's business 
was damaged because of fire. It claimed to have been 
coerced into accepting an insufficient sum from the de-
fendant under the loss of business coverage. The Supreme 
Court concluded there was nothing in the record justifying 
such accusation. The summary judgment was affirmed. 
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Four depositions were urged for examination by the 
Supreme Court. Two were in the record, two were not, 
none of which had been published or presented to the 
trial court. The court said it could not consider matters 
not in the record before the trial court. 
· Although the depositions had not been published, the 
court found the record complete enough t_o determine the 
issues presented. 
In the instant case the state of the record enables the 
court to determine the issues presented. The facts are 
uncontroverted. This court has before it a succinct 
statement of the facts. _This stipulation of facts obviates 
the publishing of the deposition. 
At the pretrial in the instant case plaintiff's attorney 
requested permission to amend her complaint. The· re-
quest was granted. Plaintiff filed her amended complaint 
on May 20, 1963. The amended complaint contained the 
additional allegation of res ipsa loquitur. The amended 
complaint was before the trial court when it granted 
defendants' motions for summary judgment. The order 
was not entered until June 3, 1963. The trial court held 
that theallegation of res ipsa loquitur in addition to neg-
ligence did not significantly alter the plaintiff's claim and 
defendants were entitled to a summary judgment. 
POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFF'S STATUS WAS NO GREATER 
THAN THAT OF A LICENSEE AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
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On the evening of March 27, 1962, Julius Jones 
asked his wife, the plaintiff, if she would walk to the Town 
House Athletic Club with him to see cchow near the steel 
was up." No on~ from Horman's Inc. or Allen· Steel Com-
pany asked Julius ]ornes or the plamtiff to go to the Town 
House Athletic Club. Mr. Hoffine, a masonry contrac-
tor, told Julius Jones on the morning of March 27, 1962 
that as soon as the steel w:as up in the Town House Athletic 
Club, Ij:o~fine woul_4 probably be able to use Jones on the 
job. On the same day, plaintiff's husband observed the 
steel beams being unloaded from a truck. , 
It is clear from the record that Mr. Hoffine, the 
masonry contractor, did not ask J~lius Jones to go to the 
job site. Jones saw the steel being unloaded from a truck 
on the day of the ac.cident. He knew the steel was not up 
~ because it had just been unloaded. The statement by Hof-
fine that he would probably be able to use Jones when the 
steel was up cannot be said to extend an implied invitation 
to Jones to go on the job site to inspect the premises in the 
evening when he had already been there the same day. 
There was no invitation, direct or implied, for Julius Jones 
or his wife to go on the premises. Julius Jones and his wife 
were both trespassers as· that term has been defined by the 
courts. 
ccA trespasser is a person who enters the 
premises of another without license, invitation or 
other right, and intrudes for some definite purpose 
of his own, or at his convenience, or merely as an 
idler with no apparent purpose other than perhaps 
to satisfy his curiosity." 38 Am. Jur. p. 771 Sec. 
109. 
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In In Re Wimmers Estafr 111 Utah 444, 182 P. 2d 
119, (Utah 1947) this court defined trespasser as follows: 
ccA trespasser is defined as a person who enters 
or remains upon land in the possession of another 
without a privilege to do so created by the posses-
sor's consent or otherwise." 
Jones' act of going upon the property of the Town 
House Athletic Club on the evening of March 27, 1962, 
was certainly at his own convenience. He had no license, 
invitation or other right from any person to enter the 
premises. He was acting as nan idler with no apparent 
purpose other than perhaps to satisfy his curiosity." He 
knew the steel was not up because he had seen it unloaded 
from a truck that saine day. 
The duty owed to a trespasser is stated in 3 8 Am. 
Jur. p. 771 Sec. 109: 
uAn owner owes trespassers no duty to keep 
the premises in a safe condition for their use, and 
as a general rule, he is not held responsible for an 
injury sustained by a trespasser upon the premises 
from a defect therein." 
It is obvious that the defendants are not liable to the 
plaintiff in her status as a trespasser. 
Assuming, as the plaintiff contends, that there was 
an implied invitation to the plaintiff's husband to go to 
the job site on the evening to see how near the steel was 
up, his status would only be elevated to that of a ((licensee" 
rather than a ((trespasser." 
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This court has defined the term cclicensee" as follows: 
((A licensee is defined as a person who is 
p7ivileged to enter or ;emain upon the land by 
VIrtue of· the possessor s consent, whether given 
by invitation or permission." See In Re Wimmers 
·Estate Supra. · 
Plaintiff's husband went to the T qwn House Athletic 
Club to see ((how near the steel was up." He did not go 
to obtain employment. The only purpos·e of his visit to the 
premises, if a,ny, was to gain knowledge so he could ask 
for employment from Mr. Hoffine, the masonry contrac-
tor. The purpose of his trip was solely for his oivn· benefit. 
Plaintiff's husband was not there for the benefit of the 
defendants, nor in any matter connected with defendants 
business. 
The courts have generally held that a person seeking 
employment on the premises of another is a licensee and 
not an invitee. 
In Leach v. Inman 12 S.E. 2d 103, plaintiff brought 
action against the owner of a building for personal in-
juries received when he fell down a stairway. Plaintiff 
alleged that he was in the building for the purpose of secur-
ing. employment from one of the tenants in the building. 
The Court held that in the· absence of any allegation that 
the defendant was guilty of wilful or wanton negligence, 
the complaint was demurrable and would be dismissed. 
The Court said: 
((A licensee is a person who is neither a cus-
tomer, nor a servant, nor a trespasser, and does 
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not stand in any contractual relation with the 
owner of the premises, and who is permitted ex-
pressly or impliedly to go thereon merely for his 
own interest, convenience or gratification; The 
owner of such premises is liable to a licensee only 
for wilful or wanton injury." 
In Rohdes v. ]. R. Watkins f5 Co., 65 SW 2d 1098, a 
woman who was seeking employment was held to be a 
uliccnsee" and not an ((invitee." The plaintiff, when 
seeking employment was told to return at a later date. 
When the plaintiff returned she fell down the stairway 
after being refused employment. The Court held: 
ccwe do not think that she sustained the re-
lation of either an express or an implied invitee 
to the premises. We think that she was a licensee 
only. She was there on her own business seeking 
employment. She was not there for the benefit of 
the defendant, nor in any matter connected with 
defendant's business. She was not there in the 
capacity of a customer. Her only purpose in 
being there was to seek employment. The mere 
fact that when she had called on one or more 
previous occasions and was told that they could 
not give her employment at that time, but could 
probably use her at some future time, did not 
create the relation of an invitee to the premises. 
Sherman and Redfield on Negligence ( 6 Ed.) Sec. 
706, thus defines an implied invitation: 
((Invitation by the owner or occupant is im-
plied by law, where the person going on the 
premises does so in the interest or for the benefit, 
real or supposed, of such owner or occupant, or in 
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the matter of mutual interest, or in the usual 
course of business, or where the person injured was 
present in the performance of some duty, official 
or otherwise." 
In Bird v. Cloverleaf-Harris Dairy, 102 Utah 330, 
125 P. 2d 797 (Utah 1942) this court held that an invitee 
became a licensee when he parked his father's automobile 
in an unauthorized area adjacent to the defendant's 
creamery plant. The automobile was damaged when a 
canopy and part of the wall of the building collapsed. 
The low,er court entered judgment for the plaintiff. The 
question on appeal was whether the parking of the auto-
mobile under the canopy changed the status of the one 
who pa,rked it from that of an invitee to that of a licensee. 
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court and remanded 
the case with directions to enter a judgment of no cause 
of action. The court held the plaintiff's son, so far as 
parking the car was concerned, was a me,re licensee and 
took the premises as he found them. 
As stated, in the Bird case supra, the courts unani-
mously hold a licensee takes the premises as he :finds 
them and that an owner owes no duty to a licensee except 
not to harm him wilfully or wantonly. 
{{It has been stated that an owner or occupant 
owes one whom he permits to enter for the latter's 
convenience, no duty except not to harm him 
wilfully or wantonly, or to set traps for him, or 
to expose him to danger recklessly or wantonly." 
38 Am. Jur. p. 765, Sec. 104. 
Plaintiff accompanied her husband to the Town 
House Athletic Club for social purposes only. She had no 
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reason whatsoever to be on the premises. She was on the 
job site because her husband had asked her to go with 
him - not because of any implied invitation from the 
defendants. 
In a number of cases the courts have held a wife to 
be a cclicensee" when she accompanied her husband to his 
place of employment. 
In Hogan v. Hess Construction Company 358 P. 2d 
755 (Kansas 1961) the Supreme Court of Kansas held a 
wife was a licensee when she accompanied he·r husband 
to his place of employment for the purpose of being 
with him and assisting him in his work. Plaintiff's hus-
band, in the course of his employment, had to move some 
stacks of sheetrock. Plaintiff in an attempt to assist her 
husband, began to move the sheetrock when they toppled 
over and pinned her to the floor. Inasmuch as there was 
no allegation of wilfull or intentional conduct on behalf 
of the defendant, a demurrer to the plaintiff's petition was 
sustained. 
The Court stated: 
uAt the time in question, the husband had as 
much right to be on the premises as he would have 
as a general employee of the defendant. As to the 
plaintiff's wife, it appears that she was neither the 
employee of the defendant nor the employee of 
Bob's Service Center, and that she was in fact the 
invitee or guest of her husband upon the premises. 
She came along with him on the Labor Day holiday 
for mutual companionship and to help him in his 
work in any way in which she could assist him." 
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The Court relied on the decision of Backman v. Vic-
kers Petroleum Co., 357 P. 2d 748 (Kansas, 1960) where 
the Court held a wife, who drove the family auto to the 
husband's place of business and slipped on some ice on the 
parking lot, was a guest of her husband but only a licensee 
of the employer of her husband. 
In Scbmidt v. Langer, et al 83 N.E. 2d 35 (Illinois 
1948) the court held a wife was a (tlicensee" when she 
accompanied her husband to an apartment building to 
repair boilers. The wife went for a social visit with her 
sister who was a co-owner of the apartment. The wife was 
injured when she fell down a stairway at the rear of the 
apartment building. A directed verdict for the defendants 
was affirmed on appeal. 
, Plaintiff cites the case of Brigman v. Fiske-Carter 
Construction Co. 136 S.E. 125 (North Carolina 1926) 
as authority for her contention that she was an ((implied 
invitee." The Brigman tase is not in point because there 
the defendant was guilty of active negligence, to wit: 
backing a truck into plaintiff's parked automobile. Mrs. 
Brigman was sitting in the car at the time it was struck 
by defendant's truck. The courts statement that Mrs. 
Brigman was an invitee was dicta because the courts 
generally hold that a licensee may recover from an owner 
or occupant of the land if that person is guilty of active 
negligence. 
There is no evidence in the instant case of any active 
negligence. The plaintiff claims the steel beams tipped 
over while she was sitting next to them. In the absence 
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of any claim of active negligence, the Brigman cas~ is not 
in point. 
The other authorities cited by plaintiff to support 
her contention that she is entitled to the same status of 
her husband involve situations where the customer is on 
the premises to transact business or at the express request 
of the property owner. The facts in the instant case do 
not fall into that category. 
At the time of this accident, the Town House 
Athletic Club was not open to any patrons. There was no 
express or implied invitation for the plaintiff or her hus-
band to visit the premises. They were there of their own 
volition and must take the premises as· they found them. 
A realistic evaluation of the facts in this record con-
clusively show the plaintiff's st~tus was no greater than 
that of a licensee. It is respectfully submitted that she 
was a trespasser and this defendant cannot be held re-
sponsible for the in juries sustained by her. If the couit 
considers the plaintiff a licensee, she is still not entitled to 
recover because there is absolutely no evidence of any 
wilfull or wanton conduct on behalf of Horman's Inc. 
POINT III 
AS A MATTER OF LAW THIS DEFENDANT 
DID NOT WILFULLY OR WANTONLY INJURE 
THE PLAINTIFF NOR DID IT KNOW OF A DAN-
GEROUS CONDITION ON THE PREMISES. 
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The steel girders were delivered to the job site by 
Allen Steel Company. The girders were set on edge in 
a driveway dug down to the foundation of the building 
so equipment could be taken out of the basement. The 
girders were about 80 feet long; two to two and a half 
feet wide at the ends and about five feet wide at the 
center. The girders were mostly in the driveway but the 
ends were sticking up out of the driveway. There was 
a 2 x 12 bolted to the top of the girders and they were 
held together by a 1 x 4 nailed across the top. 
In Wood v. Wood 8 Utah 2d 279, 333 P. 2d 630 this 
court held that where the plaintiff's status was that of a 
guest licensee, defendant's duty toward her was to re£rain 
from wilfull injuries and from permitting conditions to 
exist which might be considered as traps. In the Wood 
case the plaintiff sustained personal injuries when she fell 
down a stairwell in the garage portion of the defendant's 
home. The lower court directed a verdict and the Supreme 
Court affirme.d on the ground that the plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent as a matter of law. 
In the instant case it is obvious that defendants did 
not wilfully injure the plaintiff. The steel girders were 
set on edge in a driveway where they were plainly visible, 
and in no way obstructed f.rom view. They cannot, by 
any stretch of the imagination, be characterized as cctraps." 
In Wood v. Wood this court adopted the rule stated 
in Sec. 342 of the Restatement of Torts with respect to 
the duty of a landowner to a licensee for known dangerous 
conditions. 
ttA possessor of land is subject to liability for 
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bodily harm caused to gratuitous licensees by a 
natural or artificial condition thereon if, but only 
if, he 
(a) knows of the condition and realizes that 
it involves an unreasonable risk to them and has 
reason to believe that they will not discover the 
condition or realize the risk, and 
(b) invites or permits them to enter or remain 
upon the land, without exercising reasonable care 
(i) To make the condition reasonably safe, or 
(ii) To warn them of the risk involved." 
The rule is predicated on the proposition that the 
landowner knows of the condition and realizes it involves 
an unreasonable ·risk of harm, and also has reason to be-
lieve that the person invited or permitted on the premises 
will not discover the condition or realize the risk. There 
is no evidence in this record that defendants should have 
realized that the steel girders placed on edge in the drive-
way constituted a dangerous condition. The defendants 
had no more reason to suspect the steel girders would 
tip over than the plaintiff and her husband. The plain-
tiffs husband had undoubtedly been around construction 
areas before and did not see anything unusual about the 
way in which the girders had been placed in the driveway 
for he placed a building block on the ground adjacent to 
the girders for his wife to sit on. If he thought the girders 
constituted an unreasonable risk he certainly would not 
have invited his wife to sit next to them. It is evident 
the defendant did not expect the steel girders to tip over 
nor did the plaintiff or her husband. 
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This defendant respectfully submits that as a matter 
of law this defendant had no reason. to believe that the 
placement and location of the steel girders constituted 
an unreasonable risk of harm to a person it did not invite 
or permit on the premises. 
This court has held that it is elementary that a plain-
tiff cannot recover unless she can show that the defendant 
was negligent and that such negligence was a proximate 
cause of her injury. Mortensen v. First Security Bank of 
Utah, 12 Utah 2d 89, 363 P. 2d 75 (Utah 1961). An 
examination of this record shows that this defendant was 
not negligent. 
The plaintiff's status can be no greater than that of a 
licensee. This defendant earnestly contends that plaintiff 
was a trespasser at the time she was injured. Even if she 
reached the dignity of a licensee, she cannot recover be-
cause there is no evidence of any wilfull injury by this 
defendant nor did this defendant know that the placement 
of the steel girders in the driveway constituted an un-
reasonable risk of harm. 
The summary judgment entered by the lower court 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER 
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